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JAMES J. WHITE*
Overdraft fees now make up more than half of banks' earnings on consumer
checking accounts. In the past century, overdrafts have gone from the
banker's scourge to the banker's profit center as bankers have learned that
there is much to be made on these short term loans at breathtaking interest
rates. I note that the federal agencies have been complicit in the growth of
this form of lending. I propose that the banks and the agencies recognize
the reality and attempt to mitigate these rates by encouraging the
development of a competitive market.
I. INTRODUCTION
By hypothesis, drawing checks against insufficient funds has happened
as long as there have been checking accounts. In the early days, giving
someone a bad check was so morally reprehensible that it sometimes landed
one in jail.' A bounced check might even have drawn a reproach from the
banker on whose bank the check was drawn for fear that the checks from that
bank would get a bad name. A "rubber check" has always provoked an angry
response and perhaps an aggressive collection effort from the payee. But in
many cases, a banker who was sensitive to the needs of his customers would
pay an overdrawn check with the expectation that his depositor had made an
error and would soon cover the overdraft.
In the last half of the twentieth century, this story changed. In 2000, an
estimated 251 million checks were returned by drawee banks for insufficient
funds2 and a large number-unknown to me but in the tens or hundreds of
millions-were paid even though there were not sufficient funds in the
account on which they were drawn. In nearly every case, whether the check
was returned3 or was paid despite insufficient funds,4 the bank charged a fee.
* Robert A. Sullivan Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. Yi Gao,
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I Even today, several jurisdictions impose jail sentences for writing bad checks. See,
e.g., Los ANGELES Co. DIST. ATT'Y, LOS ANGELES COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY BAD
CHECK RESTITUTION PROGRAM 2 (2001) (quoting Steve Cooley, District Attorney: "Upon
conviction, bad check writers may face up to a year in county jail or a longer sentence in
state prison.... ."), available at http://da.co.la.ca.us/pdffbadcheck.pdf.
2 See Geoffrey R. Gerdes & Jack K. Walton II, The Use of Checks and Other
Noncash Payment Instruments in the United States, 88 FED. RES. BULL. 360, 365 (2002),
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2002/0802_2nd.pdf.
3 Banks typically charge a bounced check fee in this situation.
4 Banks typically charge an overdraft fee in this situation.
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Today, the average fee for an NSF check, paid or not, 5 is in the neighborhood
of $256 and some New York banks charge as much as $33.7 By one estimate,
banks earned more than $33 billion on NSF and overdraft fees in 2003.8
These fees make up to half of banks' earnings on consumer checking
accounts.9 Today, the banker can hardly claim to be the surrogate of the
injured payee, nor can he claim to fear that his bank's checks will be
devalued by the frequent dishonor of other checks from his bank. The
banker's tacit encouragement of overdrafts and routine return of bad checks
belies the first claim and the huge volume of returned checks belies the
second.
What was formerly reprehensible to the banker is now understood to be a
bubbling source of revenue; in the words of the market, bad checks have
become a "profit center."10 While the injury to and anger of the payee is not
less than it was, the banks on whom these checks are drawn appear to have
embraced bad checks. As we will see, thousands of banks have adopted slick,
automated programs to decide which checks to return and which to pay. The
evidence suggests that banks make more money by paying a large share of
the overdrawn checks than by sending them back."l This is in part because
semi-formal legitimation of overdrafts by a bank encourages customers who
5 When I refer to "NSF fees," in general I mean to include fees charged for any
check drawn against insufficient funds whether the check is paid or returned.
6 Greg McBride, Checking Study: Online v. Traditional Banks, BANKRATE.COM,
May 11,2005, http://www.bankrate.com/brm/news/chk/20050511 dl .asp?prodtype=bank.
7 See Dilyara Bareeva & Katherine Wyatt, NSF and Overdraft Fees in New York
State: The Impact of Bank Characteristics and Changes in Retail Payments, N.Y. ST.
BANKING DEP'T, Feb. 2005, at 3, available at
https://www.banking.state.ny.us/rp0502.pdf.
8 See Lee Conrad, As Industry Collects Billions, Consumers Cry Foul, U.S. BANKER,
May 2005, at 50, available at http://www.us-
banker.com/article.html?id=20050502M67VUQZG (citing a study by Mike Moebs,
chairman of Moebs Services, an economic research firm).
9 See Bill Stoneman, Sizing NSF-Related Fees, BANKING STRATEGIES, Jan.-Feb.
2005, at 17, 18, available at http://www.bai.org/bankingstrategies/2005-jan-
feb/sizing/?WT.mc id=PayPort sizingHP.
10 See, e.g., Sheshunoff Management Services, Platinum Overdraf M,
http://www.aba.com/cab/cab_pod.htm (last visited Nov. 27, 2006) ("Platinum
OverdraftsM ... allows financial institutions to streamline, standardize and simplify the
process of overdraft decision-making .... This highly integrated deposit account
overdraft coverage solution dramatically improves customer service and increases non-
interest income.").
11 See infra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
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would not otherwise overdraw to do so. 12 The courts have generally given
banks a free hand, and the federal agencies' behavior has ranged from full-
throated support for the banks' actions to soft-spoken approval.
So what is the problem? The problem is that the overdraft fees that the
banks earn are extraordinary 13 when measured against the banks' cost (a
dollar or less to return a check) 14 and risk (none when the check is returned
and slight when it is not). And, of course, the banks are feeding off the
weakest and poorest of their customers; 15 the poorer, not the richer, draw bad
checks. Banks can get away with such high fees in part because the light of
the market barely shines in the dark comer of NSF practices. To date, few
banks have shown any interest in advertising their low overdraft rates and
few consumers choose their bank on the belief that they will frequently
overdraw. 16 If the market could somehow be made to work here, it would
solve the problem, but I am doubtful.
12 See National Credit Union Administration Letter to Credit Unions, No. 05-CU-03,
at 6 (Feb. 2005), available at http://www.ncua.gov/letters/2005/CU/O5-CU-03.pdf
[hereinafter NCUA Letter].
13 The table below shows that the finance charge for the short-term cash advance of
overdraft protection translates to triple-digit interest rates. For example, a $20 penalty fee
imposed on a $100 overdraft when repaid in fourteen days amounts to an effective annual
percentage rate (APR) of 521%.
Effective APR For Various Reayment Period (In Days)
Fee Overdraft Period 7 14 30 45Amt. Rate
$20 $100 20% 2433% 1043% 521% 243% 162%
$25 $100 25% 3042% 1304% 652% 304% 203%
$35 $100 35% 4258% 1825% 913% 426% 284%
$35 $500 7% 852% 365% 183% 85% 57%
$25 $900 3% 338% 145% 72% 34% 23%
14 The cost to the bank is even less when an overdraft fee is charged. See, e.g.,
Perdue v. Crocker Nat'l Bank, 702 P.2d 503, 508 (Cal. 1985) ("At the time of filing the
suit, the charge was $6 for each NSF check, whether the check was honored or returned
unpaid, even though 'the actual cost incurred by the defendants in processing the NSF
check is approximately $0.30."').
15 See, e.g., Nikitra S. Bailey, Predatory Lending: The New Face of Economic
Injustice, HUM. RTS. MAG., Summer 2005, at 14, available at
http://www.abanet.org/irr/hr/summer05/predator.html.
16 But see, advertisement by Washington Mutual, offering one free Overdraft/NSF
fee for WaMu Free Checking customer,
http://www.wamu.com/personal/accountchoices/checking/default_MI.htm (last visited
Dec. 5, 2006).
2007]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
II. THE FIRST CASES
The two most prominent cases dealing with banks' rights to charge NSF
fees are Perdue v. Crocker National Bank, a 1985 decision of the California
Supreme Court,17 and Best v. United States National Bank of Oregon, a 1987
decision of the Oregon Supreme Court.18 Both were class actions. In Perdue,
the California Supreme Court reversed the trial court's grant of a demurrer 19
and allowed several causes of action to go ahead (whether the charges were
set in good faith, 20 whether the charges were unconscionable, 21 and whether
the bank engaged in deceptive practices22). In Best, the Oregon Supreme
Court reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment for defendant on.
the issue of whether the defendant had set its NSF fees in good faith.23 After
the supreme court decisions, both cases were settled without further
published opinions. 24
Despite the absence of a final and conclusive statement of the parties'
rights, each class of plaintiffs must have thought it held a comfortable lead
going into the fourth quarter. In Oregon, there was a statement that if the
plaintiffs could prove what they claimed, they would show absence of good
faith by the defendant.25 In California, the court invited a hearing at the trial
court that was unlikely to save the bank from a finding of unconscionability:
"[P]laintiff's charge that the bank's NSF fee is exorbitant, yielding a profit
far in excess of cost, cannot be dismissed on demurrer.... [T]he parties
should be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to the
commercial setting, purpose, and effect .... -26
Each of the cases dealt with several issues that recur in different forms in
later cases. In Perdue, the plaintiffs' first argument was that the signature
card was not a contract at all, that it was merely a way to show a depositor's
signature.27 That argument flopped.28
17 Perdue v. Crocker Nat'l Bank, 702 P.2d 503, 525 (Cal. 1985).
18 Best v. U.S. Nat'l Bank of Or., 739 P.2d 554, 563 (Or. 1987).
19 Perdue, 702 P.2d at 525.
20 Id. at 510.
21 Id. at 514.
22 Id. at 515-16.
23 Best, 739 P.2d at 559.
24 Dwight Golann, Developments in Consumer Financial Services Litigation, 43
Bus. LAW. 1081, 1082 (1988) (discussing settlement of Perdue); Philip Emerson, Oregon
Class Actions: The Need for Reform, 27 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 757, 769-70 (1991)
(discussing settlement of Best).
25 Best, 739 P.2d at 559.
26 Perdue, 702 P.2d at 514.
27 Id. at 509-10.
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Second, the plaintiffs claimed that the contract was not enforceable
because it gave too much discretion to the bank and so lacked consideration
for the want of duty on the bank.29 Citing the California Commercial Code
section 2305 by analogy and other California cases, the court made short
work of that argument too. 30
. Next, the Perdue court gave several pages to consideration of the
unconscionability claim.31 The court first elaborated on the consequence of
finding that the contract is a contract of adhesion. 32 That discussion brings to
memory the California court's later and more prominent unconscionability
opinion in Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc.33
Quoting from its earlier finding of unconscionability of an arbitration
clause 34 and relying on its notorious A&M Produce case,35 the court
summarized the plaintiff's rights:
Generally speaking ... there are two judicially imposed limitations on the
enforcement of adhesion contracts or provisions thereof. The first is that
such a contract or provision which does not fall within the reasonable
expectations of the weaker or 'adhering' party will not be enforced against
him. The second-a principle of equity applicable to all contracts
generally-is that a contract or provision, even if consistent with the
reasonable expectations of the parties, will be denied enforcement if,
considered in its context, it is unduly oppressive or "unconscionable." 36
The court stated that the 2000% difference between the NSF charge of $6
and the claimed cost of $0.30 did not prove plaintiffs' case, particularly since
the $0.30 cost was contested.37 However, with apparent approval, it cited
several cases that found a price to be unconscionable, and it explicitly
rejected the defendant's best argument-that a price equal to the market price
cannot be unconscionable. 38 The court concluded by drawing attention to the
2 8 Id. at 510.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 510-14.
32 Perdue, 702 P.2d at 511.
33 Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000).
34 See Perdue, 702 P.2d at 511 (discussing Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 623 P.2d
165, 180 (Cal. 1981)).
35 See id. (discussing A&M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal. App. 3d 473, 497
(Cal. Ct. App. 1982)).
36 Id. (quoting Graham, 623 P.2d at 172-73).
37 Id. at 513.
38 Id. at 512.
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small print of the deposit agreement and to the fact that under the agreement,
the "bank has all the rights and the depositor all the duties. 39
The court concluded its unconscionability discussion with the obligatory
direction that the trial court allow the defendant to show the "commercial
setting, purpose" and the like.40 Of course, as Professor Leff pointed out
years ago, this opportunity is hardly what the defendant wants or needs.4 1 As
Professor Leff noted then, the intention and effect of many clauses that are
claimed to be unconscionable is to squeeze the stuffing out of the plaintiff.42
Making that clear will not help the defendant.
Finally, the Perdue court dealt with the argument that the six dollar NSF
fee is an invalid penalty-i.e., that it is a failed liquidated damage clause. 43
In a holding that has been followed in all the later decisions,44 the court noted
that there is no promise by the depositor not to draw checks on insufficient
funds.45 And if there is no promise to be broken, then the fee cannot be a
penalty for breaking the contract.
In Oregon, the plaintiffs did almost as well as they did in California. The
court dismissed the penalty argument for the same reason as was given in
California-no agreement broken, no penalty possible.46
Disagreeing with the California Supreme Court at every turn, the Oregon
court rejected plaintiffs' claim of unconscionability. 47 The court noted that
the plaintiffs had agreed to charges "existing at any time."48 It noted that the
costs were relatively small (five dollar NSF fee) 49 and were similar to those
charged by others (so moving toward the rejected market defense?). 50 The
plaintiffs could close their accounts at any time and apparently had at least
"ordinary intelligence and experience." 51 So unconscionability might be okay
for the funny people in California, but not for Oregonians.
39 Id. at 513.
40 Perdue, 702 P.2d at 514.
41 See Arthur A. Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New
Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 485, 544-46 (1967).
42 See id. at 544.
43 Perdue, 702 P.2d at 515-16.
44 See, e.g., Howard v. Babcock, 863 P.2d 150, 160 (Cal. 1993).
45 Perdue, 702 P.2d at 516.
46 Best v. U.S. Nat'l Bank of Or., 739 P.2d 554, 556 (Or. 1987).
47 Id.
4 8 
Id.
4 9 Id. at 556.
50 Id.
51 Id.
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The Best court did find that the defendant had to use good faith in setting
the NSF fees.52 It cited Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 205 and
particularly comment d on good faith performance:
Subterfuges and evasions violate the obligation of good faith in
performance even though the actor believes his conduct to be justified. But
the obligation goes further; bad faith may be overt or may consist of
inaction, and fair dealing may require more than honesty. A complete
catalogue of types of bad faith is impossible, but the following types are
among those which have been recognized in judicial decisions: evasion of
the spirit of the bargain, lack of diligence and slacking off, willful rendering
of imperfect performance, abuse of a power to specify terms, and
interference with or failure to cooperate in the other party's performance. 53
The court continued: "It is ... not necessarily sufficient, as the Bank
contends, that the Bank acted honestly in setting its NSF fees or that its fees
were similar to those of other banks. '54 The court concluded that there was
"a genuine issue of material fact whether the Bank set its NSF fees in
accordance with the reasonable expectations of the parties," and if the fees
were not in accordance with those expectations, they would be in bad faith.55
The Best court suggested that the fact that the fees were called "service
charges," and that they were not prominently mentioned in the contract,
could lead to the inference that the bank would fix them to give the same
return of cost and profit as other fees:
This inference could reasonably lead to the further inference that the
depositors reasonably expected that the Bank's NSF fees would be priced
similarly to those checking account fees of which the depositors were
aware-the Bank's monthly checking account service fees and per check
fees, if any. By "priced similarly," we mean priced to cover the Bank's NSF
check processing costs plus an allowance for overhead costs plus the Bank's
ordinary profit margin on checking account services.56
The court concluded by noting that there was evidence that the fees were
not in good faith if the test was "costs" plus "ordinary profit margin. '57
Even though the plaintiffs had lost an NSF case in front of the New York
Court of Appeals, 58 the plaintiffs' offense looked unstoppable in the summer
52 Best, 739 P.2d at 562.
53 Id. at 557-58 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. d
(1981)).
54 Id. at 558.
55 Id. at 559.
56 Id. at 559.
57 Id. at 559.
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of 1987. One does not have to be clairvoyant to know what the banks'
appellate lawyers told their clients about the meaning of these cases. I
suspect that the banks' lawyers in both Perdue and Best said that it was time
to make a deal with the plaintiffs. And the plaintiffs' lawyers might have
been justified to dream of easy paydays from cases in Chicago, Miami,
Dallas, and Atlanta.
It was not to be. Perdue and Best were the high-water mark. As far as .1
can tell, no plaintiff ever won again. At least there are no reported opinions
to document any plaintiff victories after 1987.59
III. THE LATER CASES
In Tolbert v. First National Bank of Oregon, the Oregon Supreme Court
cut the legs out from under Best.60 In Tolbert, the bank argued that a bank
could act in bad faith only if it set the NSF fees in a way that conflicted with
the "reasonable contractual expectations" of the plaintiffs.6 1 Noting that its
employees and its documents made clear the initial fees, that the agreement
.plainly gave the bank "discretion" to set new fees, and that new fees were
announced to the customers by mail at or near the time they were instituted,
the bank argued that, as a matter of law, the customers could not challenge
the fees as set in bad faith because every customer had agreed to the fees
under First National's scheme. The court found that the plaintiffs'
"reasonable expectations" were irrelevant where the plaintiffs had agreed to
the fees charged by the bank.62 Alternatively, the court held that the forms of
notice, the terms, and the kinds of agreement proved that the plaintiffs'
reasonable expectations had been met.63
After Tolbert, little is left of Best. If a bank is careful to make written
disclosures of its current charges, to state how it uses broad discretion to set
new charges, and to send notice of changes, the bank cannot be attacked for
having failed to use good faith in setting its NSF fees. Any bank that pays the
least attention to its agreements and disclosures can meet the Tolbert test.
58 See Jacobs v. Citibank, N.A., 459 N.Y.S.2d 781, 783 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983).
59 In a recent unpublished case from the Ninth Circuit, however, the plaintiffs are
hanging on by their fingernails. See In re Wash. Mut. Overdraft Prot. Litig., No. 04-
55885, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 22863, at *3 (9th Cir. Sept. 7, 2006).
60 Tolbert v. First Nat'l Bank of Or., 823 P.2d 965, 969, 971 (Or. 1991), accord
Wallace v. Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 938 S.W.2d 684, 686 (Tenn. 1997).
61 Tolbert, 823 P.2d at 967.
6 2 Id. at 969.
63 Id. at 971.
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I Except in Perdue, the argument that high NSF fees are unconscionable
has failed. Of course, that argument was rejected in Best6
contemporaneously with Perdue. In Saunders v. Michigan Avenue National
Bank, the Illinois intermediate appellate court affirmed the trial court's
dismissal of plaintiff's claim that the NSF policy was unconscionable. 65 The
court emphasized that the plaintiff was "not intimidated or coerced into
accepting the terms" but was "free to select from a multitude of other Banks
with a variety of services and fees."'66 To the plaintiff's claim that the $220 of
fees that she incurred were so excessive that the amount alone was evidence
of unconscionability, the court responded that the plaintiff herself
exaggerated the fees by waiting two months to pay off the overdraft.
The Alabama Supreme Court rejected the unconscionability argument
not on its merits but because unconscionability gives a plaintiff no
"affirmative relief."'67 Of course, the court's argument is hardly conclusive; if
the term that authorized the fees was invalid as unconscionable, the plaintiff
should be able to recover the improperly collected fees in restitution because
there would be no contractual basis for the bank to claim them.
By 1998, the plaintiffs had turned to a more sophisticated, but no more
successful argument-that NSF or overdraft fees were essentially interest. If
the fees were interest charges, they might be subject to the disclosure
requirements of the Truth in Lending Act68 and in many cases (since the
overdraft was small, the period outstanding was short, and the $20 or $30 fee
was high by comparison) would be usurious under applicable state law.69
The courts found that the contested charges were not interest and therefore
not usurious. 70
When the drawee bank dishonors a check drawn on insufficient funds,
this interest charge argument fails because, by dishonoring, the bank has
declined to make a loan. If there was never a loan to the customer, there can
be no interest charge. When the bank pays the overdraft and so charges an
"overdraft" fee, not an "NSF" fee, the plaintiffs' argument is more plausible.
But the fact that the fee is flat, not related to the time the loan is outstanding
64 Best v. U.S. Nat'l Bank of Or., 739 P.2d 554, 556 (Or. 1987) (holding that "[t]he
unconscionability doctrine is inapplicable to the amount of the fee").
65 Saunders v. Mich. Ave. Nat'l Bank, 662 N.E.2d 602, 611 (111. App. Ct. 1996).
Saunders also had a good faith and an illegal penalty cause of action. These too were
dismissed without trial.
66 Id.
67 Sanders v. Colonial Bank of Ala., 551 So. 2d 1045, 1045 (Ala. 1989).
68 Taylor v. Union Planters Bank, 964 F. Supp. 1120, 1122 (S.D. Miss. 1997).
69 Video Trax v. NationsBank, 33 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1044 (S.D. Fla. 1998); Nicolas
v. Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank, 182 F.R.D. 226,231-32 (S.D. Miss. 1998).
70 Nicolas, 182 F.R.D. at 231-32; Video Trax, 33 F. Supp. 2d at 1044; Taylor, 964
F. Supp. at 1124.
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or to the principal balance of the loan, makes this fee different from a
conventional interest charge whose amount is dependant on principal balance
and term.
Some plaintiffs have argued that banks consciously arrange the order of
payment of checks to maximize the number and amount of NSF fees. 7'
Assume a depositor has $2,000 in her account and five checks totaling
$2,350 (one check of $1,950, and four checks of $100). If the bank returned
the large check and paid the other four, there would be one NSF fee, but if it
paid the large check first, it would collect four fees. Depositors claimed that
banks who used their discretion to pay the larger first, did so to maximize
their fees. 72 Banks responded that they believed their customers would want
to have the largest-and presumably most important-creditor paid even if a
larger number of small creditors were disappointed.73
The banks have prevailed. In Hill v. St. Paul Federal Bank for Savings,
plaintiffs claimed that the practice of paying large checks first was a
violation of the banks' duty of good faith and that the practice violated the
Illinois Consumer Fraud Act. 74 The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's
dismissal.75 First, it noted that the deposit agreements gave the banks
discretion to pay or return NSF checks. 76 It found that Article 4 of the
Uniform Commercial Code gave drawee banks discretion about the order in
which they wished to pay checks that were presented for payment on the
same day.77 That discretion rested in section 4-303 even before the 1990
amendments to Article 4 when the statute provided that payment may be
made "in any order convenient to the bank."'78 After the 1990 amendments,
the rule rests on a more elaborate statement in Comment 7 to section 4-303. 79
71 Hill v. St. Paul Fed. Bank for Sav., 768 N.E.2d 322, 324 (Ill. 2002).
7 2 Id. at 326.
73 Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 9, Hill v. St. Paul Fed. Bank for Sav., 768 N.E.2d
322 (Ill. 2002) (No. 1-00-2226), 2001 WL 34315791.
74 Hill, 768 N.E.2d at 324.
75 Id. at 323.
7 6 Id. at 324.
77 Id. at 325 ("[ltems may be accepted, paid, certified, or charged to the indicated
account of its customer in any order." (quoting U.C.C. § 4-303(b) (1957)).
7 8 Id
79 Comment 7 reads in part:
As between one item and another no priority rule is stated. This is justified
because of the impossibility of stating a rule that would be fair in all cases, having in
mind the almost infinite number of combinations of large and small checks in
relation to the available balance on hand in the drawer's account; the possible
methods of receipt; and other variables. Further, the drawer has drawn all the
checks, the drawer should have funds available to meet all of them and has no basis
for urging one should be paid before another ....
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After nearly twenty years of repeated and varied attacks by many teams
of plaintiffs' lawyers, the banks have lost only two reported cases.
Unconscionability, the winning theory in California, has succeeded nowhere
else. The argument that charging high NSF fees is a violation of drawee
banks' duty to perform their contracts in good faith has won only in Oregon,
and, even there, a later case has undermined that victory. If the plaintiffs
have a future, it is not in the courts.
IV. EARLY REGULATION
From the beginning, the Comptroller of the Currency has played a role in
the dispute between depositors and their banks. In the last year, all of the
federal financial agencies have proposed practices concerning overdraft fees.
Since 1971, the Comptroller has had a regulation that urges banks to set
their fees "on a competitive basis and not on the basis of any agreement. '80
The function of the 1971 version seems to be only to warn banks away from
anti-trust violations.
In 1983, the Comptroller issued a revision that was plainly aimed at NSF
fees, among others.8' As the California Supreme Court notes in its Perdue
opinion, this revision was published while Perdue was before the California
courts.8 2 The court rejected plaintiffs' argument that the regulation was an
inappropriate attempt to influence pending litigation. 83 The revision was
more elaborate than its predecessor.8 4 Subsection (c) of the revision asserted
Id. (quoting U.C.C. § 4-303 cmt. 7 (1957) (amended 1990)).
80 12 C.F.R. § 7.8000 (1972) ("All charges to customers should be arrived at by each
bank on a competitive basis and not on the basis of any agreement, arrangement,
undertaking, understanding or even discussion among banks or their officers.").
81 See 12 C.F.R. § 7.8000 (1984).
82 Perdue v. Crocker Nat'l Bank, 702 P.2d 503, 518 (Cal. 1985).
83 Id. at 518 n.22.
84 12 C.F.R. § 7.8000 (1984).
(a) All charges to customers should be arrived at by each bank on a competitive
basis and not on the basis of any agreement, arrangement, undertaking,
understanding or discussion with other banks or their officers.
(b) Establishment of deposit account service charges, and the amounts thereof,
is a business decision made by each bank and the Office will not substitute its
judgment. In establishing deposit account service charges, the bank may consider,
but is not limited to considering:
(1) Costs incurred by the bank, plus a profit margin, in providing the service;
(2) The deterrence of misuse by customers of banking services;
(3) The enhancement of the competitive position of the bank in accord with the
bank's marketing strategy;
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federal preemption in the setting of fees: State laws setting or restricting fees
"impair the efficiency of national banks and conflict with the regulatory
scheme governing the national banking system and are preempted by federal
law."' 85 The banks argued that federal law had preempted the plaintiffs' state
(unconscionability) claims.86 The banks lost, and the argument has not
played an important role in the cases since.
I do find some irony here. Remember that the Comptroller is a federal
official whose duty is to seek the common good, not merely to help banks
skin their customers. Under subsection (b)(1) the bank should consider its
costs and a proper "profit margin" in setting its fees. 87 Here is a case where
the banks' fees are trivial and the profit margin is grandly in excess of that
earned on any other loan in the bank. How does subsection (b)(1) justify a
fee of $25 or $30?
The second subsection endorses banks' deterrence of misuse;88
presumably this means keeping depositors from overdrawing their accounts;
but drawing an NSF check is a "misuse" only if one regards an NSF check
from the perspective of the payee. As I suggest above, NSF fees are a profit
center for the drawee, a valued use, not a misuse. 89
The third and fourth subsections of (b) concern only banks' wealth, its
"competitive position," and its "safety and soundness." 90 Stated as baldly as
(4) Maintenance of the safety and soundness of the institution.
(c) A national bank may establish any deposit account service charge pursuant
to paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section notwithstanding any state laws which
prohibit the charge assessed or limit or restrict the amount of that charge. Those
laws impair the efficiency of national banks and conflict with the regulatory scheme
governing the national banking system and are preempted by federal law.
(d) This interpretive ruling does not apply to (1) charges imposed by a national
bank in its capacity as a fiduciary, which are governed by 12 CFR 9; and (2) service
charges on dormant accounts which are governed by 12 CFR 7.7515.
Id.
85Id. § 7.8000(c). In Perdue the court noted that Article 4 of the UCC governs many
aspects of the relation between the depositor and his bank. 702 P.2d at 521. In general, no
state statutes limit banks' NSF fees, so the preemption issue has not been pushed by the
banks. But the issue arose in 1999 when two California municipalities (Santa Monica and
San Francisco) set limits on ATM fees. See generally Blair S. Walker, States, Cities
Tussle With Banks Over ATM Surcharges, STATELINE.ORG, Nov. 19, 1999,
http://www.stateline.org/live/ViewPage.action?siteNodeld=136&languageld=1 &contentl
d=13856.
86 See, e.g., Perdue, 702 P.2d at 520-21.
87 12 C.F.R. § 7.8000(b)(1) (1984).
88 12 C.F.R. § 7.8000(b)(2) (1984).
89 See supra notes 3-12 and accompanying text.
90 12 C.F.R. § 7.8000 (b)(3)-(4) (1984).
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they are, these justifications seem remarkable to me. "Do what you need to
do to make money, even if you take advantage of your most stupid and weak
customers." Is that what the Comptroller is urging? It seems so.
The Comptroller has issued revisions in 1984, 1988, 1996, and 2001. 9 1
All of the revisions maintain the four rules with little change. The preemption
rule has been softened,92 and the language of the regulation has been
modified to make clear the Comptroller's opinion that NSF fees are not
interest charges. 93
The Comptroller appeared as an amicus in the Perdue case 94 and he
appears to have been a steadfast advocate of the banks' position ever since.
There is no hint in his position in court or in the body or accompanying
commentary that he regards banks' NSF policies, which must be well known
to him, to be problematic because they are so large in comparison to the
banks' costs. That this might be a case where the market has failed seems
never to have occurred to the Comptroller.
V. NEW FEDERAL RULES
In February of 2005, the four federal agencies that govern financial
institutions95 issued a document called "Joint Guidance on Overdraft
Protection Programs" (Guidance). 96 The Guidance does not deal with fees for
checks that are returned; it deals with the growing alternative of paying and
charging for overdrafts. While this document went through a commentary
process of the kind that might be used for a formal regulation of one of the
91 49 Fed. Reg. 28,237, 28,238 (July 11, 1984) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 7.8000
(1984)); 53 Fed. Reg. 51,535, 51,535 (Dec. 22, 1988) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 7.8000
(1988)); 61 Fed. Reg. 4,849, 4,869-70 (Feb. 9, 1996) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 7.4002
(1996)); 66 Fed. Reg. 34,784, 34,787-88 (July 2, 2001) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 7.4002)
(2001)). This change is doubtless a response to cases like First Bank v. Tony's Tortilla
Factory, 877 S.W.2d 285, 288 (Tex. 1994) (holding that NSF fees are not interest), and
Bank One v. Mazaika (In re Citibank Credit Card Litig.), 680 A.2d 845, 847 (Pa. 1996)
(holding that NSF fees are interest).
92 Compare 49 Fed. Reg. 28,237, 28,237 (July 11, 1984) (codified at 12 C.F.R.
§ 7.8000 (1984)) with 66 Fed. Reg. 34,784, 34,788 (July 2, 2001) (codified at 12 C.F.R.
§ 7.4002 (2001)).
93 66 Fed. Reg. 34,784, 34,786 (July 2, 2001) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 7.4001
(2001)).
94 See Perdue v. Crocker Nat'l Bank, 702 P.2d 503, 507 (Cal. 1985).
95 The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System (Board), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and
National Credit Union Administration (NCUA).
96 See Joint Guidance on Overdraft Protection Programs, 70 Fed. Reg. 8428 (Feb.
18, 2005), available at http://www.ots.treas.gov/docs/7/73252.pdf [hereinafter
Guidance].
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agencies, the document itself does not purport to be a regulation of any of
those agencies.97 Nevertheless the Guidance cannot be ignored by any of the
governed financial institutions even if a bank's violation of the Guidance
might not give an injured depositor a civil cause of action against the bank
for violating the Guidance.
The Guidance shows the federal agencies either to be in denial about
banks' practices or to be engaging in a splendid hypocrisy. On the one hand,
the Guidance seems to deny that overdraft fees are loans.98 On the other
hand, the Guidance urges the banks not to market these plans as loans. 99 The
Guidance shows an even deeper hypocrisy by insisting that these transactions
be treated as loans in banks' reports to the federal agencies but in directing
that they be made in such a way that they will not be regarded as loans for
the Truth in Lending Act, thus insuring that no APR needs to be revealed to
the depositor/debtor.' 00
As I suggest above, most banks have now realized that there is money to
be made in charging NSF fees on returned checks and even more money to
be made by paying most of those checks (so encouraging more overdrafts)
and charging an overdraft fee for each.10 1 Except in name, the banks have
abandoned the idea that paying overdrafts is a "courtesy" or that overdrafts
are to be discouraged. They are steaming full speed ahead with sophisticated,
software-controlled overdraft plans while the federal agencies are still
pretending that allowing overdrafts is a courtesy, not a loan.
The Guidance makes the obligatory warnings that banks must be careful
not to advance credit to those who are not creditworthy and to be careful to
follow the applicable law on disclosures and the like. 102 It also encourages
certain disclosures about fees and notification of changes in fees. 103 These
exhortations are unremarkable but salutary.
The last section of the Guidance on "Best Practices" warns that
institutions "should not market the program in a manner that encourages
routine or intentional overdrafts."' 4 If I am even half right about the banks'
current practices, their incentives, and their plans, that warning is
hypocritical, for it urges the banks not to "market" a plan that most banks
have implemented or soon will implement. 105 Other parts of the "Best
97 Id. at 8428.
98 See id. at 8429.
99 Id. at 8430.
100 See id. at 8429-3 1.
101 See Conrad, supra note 8, at 50.
102 Guidance, supra note 96, at 8430.
103 Id. at 8431.
104 Id. at 8430.
105 Id.
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Practices" section tell the banks to disclose all of the features of their plans to
their depositors. 106 Won't that "disclosure" inevitably "encourage[] routine
or intentional overdrafts"? 10 7
In its instructions on characterizing a permissible overdraft, the
Guidance's hypocrisy becomes more evident. The "Best Practices" section
tells the banks to emphasize the discretionary nature of the program even
while The National Credit Union Administration admits that when a bank
pays an NSF check, "credit is extended,"' 1 8 and also notes that "[o]verdraft
balances should be reported on regulatory reports as loans."'1 9 Of course,
most of these programs are, or will be, discretionary in name only. The
Guidance admits that the "accommodation" formerly granted to customers
has "become automated, 11 0 that is, the bank's computer has been
programmed to pay overdrafts for customers who meet certain criteria
without the concurrent exercise of any human discretion.
Understand the legal significance of the banks' discretion: if the bank has
not agreed in writing to make the advance, the fee is not treated as interest
for the purpose of the Truth in Lending Act. 11I So, on the one hand, the
Guidance recognizes and encourages behavior that makes the transaction
appear to be something other than a loan for the purposes of consumer credit
disclosures, and, on the other hand, it insists that the transaction be treated as
a loan for reporting to the agency and for the banks' own underwriting. Put
more harshly, the Guidance condones misrepresentation to the depositor.
In my opinion, the regulatory agencies wish neither to see, hear, nor
speak of these loans. By pretending that the former practices still prevail-
that paying an overdraft is merely an occasional act of generosity by the
banker-the agencies spare themselves the task of confronting the real issues
in a burgeoning area of lending. One remedy for the excessive fees that are
charged for overdrafts and NSF checks is to encourage a market to develop
around this service. If banks competed to provide overdraft loans, the fees
would drop and the depositors would be served by lower costs. But the
Guidance explicitly discourages the growth of such a market by warning
against "marketing" a service for intentional overdrafts. And the agencies'
106 Id. at 8430-31.
107 Id. at 8430.
108 NCUA Letter, supra note 12, at 7.
109 Id. at 9.
110 Guidance, supra note 96, at 8429.
111 See Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(c)(3) (2006). That section excludes the
following from the definition of finance charge: "Charges imposed by a financial
institution for paying items that overdraw an account, unless the payment of such items
and the imposition of the charge were previously agreed upon in writing." Id.
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conscious disregard of the true nature of'this market allows them to ignore
the fact that these are loans at extremely high rates.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is hard to know what to do about the market for NSF loans. Twenty
years have shown that the courts do not have the answer. In any case the
courts' tools, unconscionability and bad faith, are blunt instruments that are
unlikely to produce an efficient solution.
If the regulatory agencies are to deal with the problem, a first step would
be to treat overdraft advances as loans and so subject to the Truth in Lending
Act and to whatever usury laws might apply. That at least would require the
disclosure of an APR, and it would make some depositors look elsewhere for
loans. How many depositors would be scared off by the high APR? That's
the question, and I am not sanguine that an APR disclosure would change
much.
Perhaps the market could be made to work here. In a competitive market
there is doubtless an equilibrium at a rate that might be high but still well
below the rate that prevails now. A first step toward a market is to do the
opposite of the Guidance, to encourage "marketing" of the program and
disclosure of APR's. Would a market flourish here? It might; despite the
adverse selection problem, some banks might find it in their interest to attract
overdrawers, even at rates substantially below those now prevailing."l 2
Last and least, in my opinion, should be a prohibition of overdraft loans
or a regulatory mandate of NSF or overdraft fees. It is clear that many
depositors wish to borrow by overdrawing their accounts. In my opinion,
denying them this privilege is more reprehensible than letting them make
foolish loans. And I have no reason to think that a federal agency could find
the right price if it were given the power to set the rate.
1 12 See, e.g., UNIV. OF MICH. CREDIT UNION, Overdraft Protection Options,
http://www.umcu.org/checking/overdraft.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2006) (charging "$24
per day for all NSF transactions occurring on that day up to $500"); see also
COUNTRYWIDE BANK, Overdraft Line of Credit,
https://bank.countrywide.com/scontent.aspx?cmtag=Content-overdraft (last visited Nov.
30, 2006) ("Because overdraft line of credit is a short-term loan, you will be responsible
for paying the current accrued interest plus 5% of the outstanding balance on this loan on
a monthly basis.").
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